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Abstract
In this paper, I present an account of group competence that is explicitly framed for 
cases of epistemic performances. According to it, we must consider group epistemic 
competence as the group agents’ capacity to produce knowledge, and not the result 
of the summation of its individual members’ competences to produce knowledge. 
Additionally, I contend that group competence must be understood in terms of group 
normative status. To introduce my view, I present Jesper Kallestrup’s (Synthese 
1–19, 2016) denial that group competence involves anything over and beyond the 
aggregation of individual competences. I have divided my response into two parts. 
First, I compare two conceptions of competence from Ernest Sosa’s reliabilist vir-
tue epistemology (Sosa in Philos Stud 142:5–15, 2009; Philos Perspect 24:465–475, 
2010a; Knowing full well, Princeton University Press, 2010b; Judgment & agency, 
Oxford University Press, 2015; Epistemology, Princeton University Press, 2017; in: 
Silva-Filho, Tateo (eds), Thinking about oneself: The place and value of reflection 
in philosophy and psychology, Springer, 2019) and David Löwenstein’s (Know-
how as competence. A Rylean responsibilist account, Vittorio Klostermann, 2017) 
account of know-how. Second, I take the results from this comparison and apply 
them to the issue of group know-how, by the hand of Orestis Palermos and Debo-
rah Tollefsen’s twofold approach to the topic (Palermos and Tollefsen, in: Carter, 
Clark, Kallestrup, Palermos, Pritchard (eds) Socially extended epistemology, Oxford 
University Press, 2018). Finally, I return to Kallestrup’s denial to make my point in 
favour of the conception of genuine group competence as the group normative status 
to achieve success.
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The capacity of groups of individuals to perform actions is a well-known phenom-
enon in the literature. There are debates regarding whether this capacity results 
from aggregation (the summation of each member’s capacity) or integration (the 
reflection of irreducible group properties). This picture parallels another debate 
which focuses on one particular outcome that results from action: the nature of 
group propositional knowledge. According to this debate, the main question at 
issue is whether we should consider group knowledge in terms of summativ-
ism (as the summation of each member’s knowledge or the representation of the 
majority of the members’ knowledge) or some form of non-summativism (as the 
result of group knowledge that is not reducible to its members’ knowledge). The 
clarification of both debates requires further development of the agential proper-
ties involved in group knowledge. Jesper Kallestrup provides a recent approach to 
this issue. His account of group virtue epistemology (2016) focuses on one par-
ticular conception of group epistemology: Ernest Sosa’s competence-based virtue 
reliabilism (2009, 2010a, 2010b, 2015, 2017, 2019). Kallestrup comes across a 
striking situation: although a group epistemic agent may produce group knowl-
edge that is not reducible to its members’ knowledge, the reliable competences 
that the group manifests to acquire such knowledge are simply the summation 
of the group’s individual members’ competences. In a nutshel: group knowledge 
is irreducibly collective, whereas competences in general, and epistemic compe-
tences in particular, are reducible to individual compenteces—how is this possi-
ble, if an agent’s knowledge should result from the epistemic competences of the 
same agent and not others? He refers to this as “the crucial disanalogy”.
In this paper, I will resolve Kallestrup’s disanalogy in a different way by con-
tending that a group epistemic agent may manifest competences that are not 
reducible, nor do they result from, the summation of its individual members’ 
competences. Specifically, I maintain that group competence should be identified 
with the group’s normative status.
This is the structure of the paper: In Sect. 2, I briefly describe the debates on 
rejectionionism about group belief in an attempt to focus on a less controversial 
approach that stems from the assumption of group epistemic agents. In Sect. 3, I 
focus on Kallestrup’s crucial disanalogy, showing in detail how it emerges from 
Sosa’s model on epistemic competences. This scenario motivates two questions. 
First, what is the nature of competence? Second, is the notion of competence 
bound to methodological individualism? Sect. 4 focuses on the first question by 
delving into the idea of performance and, in particular, the concept of skilled per-
formance. I do so by comparing Ernest Sosa and David Löwenstein’s concep-
tions of competence, aiming to show that both approaches share a common core 
assumption: an agent’s manifestation of reliable competence to achieve a spe-
cific goal indicates that a set of norms guides the agent’s performance which, on 
the one hand, regulates the agent’s activity and, on the other hand, are properly 
understood by the agent as a guide to performing well. Then I address the second 
question, and for this purpose, I compare this account of competence with group 
1 3
Synthese 
agency by drawing on Orestis Palermos and Deborah Tollefsen’s joint approach 
to group know-how. According to this approach, group agents may be deemed 
as knowing-how to act from two perspectives: one intellectualist and the other 
anti-intellectualis. Thus, in Sect. 5, I return to Kallestrup’s denial of robust group 
competence to confront it by appealing to this new account of competence based 
on methodological anti-individualism. Finally, I present an account of a group 
agent whose normative status instantiates its epistemic competence.
2  Group knowledge
Epistemic life is not only exhibited by individuals. A research team that publishes a 
paper contending a new approach to a particular question, a jury that renders a ver-
dict or a management board that evaluates the last year’s financial results all depict 
situations in which a collection of individuals is subject to epistemic attributions. 
Accordingly, the individuals themselves are not subject to such attributions; instead, 
it is the group who is subject to them. In other words, these situations depict groups 
acting as a whole entity to produce an epistemic outcome. Furthermore, what does 
“as a whole entity” mean? The battle begins here. Summativists hold that a group 
possesses a property (such as an epistemic or doxastic property) if, and only if, all 
or the majority of its members have this property (Quinton, 1976). In contrast, Non-
summativists hold that some groups may feature purely collective properties that 
cannot be traced back to its members, being considered as mere individuals.
2.1  Group belief
Different conceptions of non-summativism have emerged; however, they seem to 
differ regarding the role of belief. Some people, known as believers, consider group 
beliefs to be unproblematic and hold that group beliefs are the basis of group knowl-
edge (or group epistemic competence). Margaret Gilber’s acceptance account is 
responsible for one of the most influential branches of this view, which states that a 
group may be a genuine bearer of a collective belief p in so far as it results from the 
members’ joint commitment to accept p as a body (Gilbert, 1987, 2002, 2004).
However, others reject this view—those known as rejectionists—and hold instead 
that joint commitment does not yield group belief, but rather group acceptance 
(Hakli, 2007; Meijers, 2002; Wray, 2001). Rejectionists motivate their view by stat-
ing that beliefs have distinctive features that acceptance does not, such as non-volun-
tariness,1 gradability or context dependence, among others (Preyer, 2003). Believers 
1 Regarding the issue of voluntariness, Tuomela avoids thinking of acceptance as a necessary condi-
tion. According to his view, «acceptance "typically" is an intentional mental acceptance, but it need not 
always be. As non-intentional acceptance, it clearly seems possible that a person come to accept that 
there is a tree in front of him without doing this at will or on purpose. As a matter of psychological fact, 
if it indeed is one, this acceptance is normally based on the person’s causally induced belief that there is 
a tree in front of him. Given this, the acceptance involves reflection on one’s belief (or beliefs) without 
yet being a mental action performed on purpose» (2000a, p. 125).
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have struck this view back by adopting alternatives to the joint acceptance account 
(Tuomela, 1995, 2007; Tollefsen, 2003). Some other approaches opted to dodge the 
bullet of group belief in terms of typically mental states hosted in an individual’s 
mind by appealing to a functional distribution of epistemic tasks (Bird, 2010), group 
agency as group rationality (List & Pettit, 2011; Pettit, 2007; Tollefsen, 2004), 
and group cognition in terms of dynamical systems (Palermos, 2016; Palermos & 
Pritchard, 2016). More recently, a new line of contributions has returned to Hakli’s 
(2007) possibility of group knowledge without group belief, but with alternative 
ways, such as knowledge-first collective epistemology (Simion et al., 2020) or col-
lective telic epistemology based on apt judgmental knowledge (Carter, 2020).2
2.2  Group epistemic agency
As mentioned, both believers and rejectionists share the assumption that group 
attributions of knowledge fit into a non-summativist framework. Thus, if group 
properties happen to be somewhat controversial to break down in terms of belief—
where the belief is a necessary condition for the traditional conception of knowl-
edge—switching to agential properties may stand as a good alternative. In fact, it 
is because the mere summation of each members’ contributions—through individu-
ally considered endorsements or acceptances—does not accurately explain how the 
group comes to know that group epistemic agency poses an appealing framework to 
start coping with the phenomenon of group or collective knowledge.3 However, it 
leads back to the old problem of summativism: why should we contemplate group 
epistemic agents when it is more intuitive to consider a set of individual epistemic 
agents that interrelate with each other following specific patterns? We may then 
answer by saying that, ultimately, it is because there might be significant divergence 
between the individual epistemic states of the group members and the collective 
epistemic states of the group considered as a whole entity. The so-called discursive 
dilemma (List & Pettit, 2004, p. 213; 2011, Ch. 2) eloquently depicts such scenarios. 
According to the discursive dilemma, a group may deliberately attempt to produce 
an epistemic outcome p that happens to diverge from the aggregation of the majority 
of the individual beliefs as shown in the following Table 1. 
This representation of the dilemma shows a situation in which the aggregation of 
attitudes regarding pieces of evidence one and two (bottom-up) provides the group 
2 Despite the similarities between Carter’s approach and the one I support in this paper—especially 
regarding Kallestrup’s view on the crucial disanalogy between group knowledge and group competence 
(2020, p. 5242)—my proposal elaborates on competences as opposed to knowledge—although it is due 
to the manifestation of the former that makes it possible to achieve the later.
3 In Kay Mathiesen’s words, «work on “agent centered” epistemology should focus on groups as well as 
individuals» (2011, p. 23). That is, in so far as we accept that knowledge stems from the performance of 
certain kinds of action—say, cognitive or epistemic actions—we are pushed to accept that the scale for 
specific cases of group or collective knowledge exceeds the individual level when accounting for them. 
However, when it comes to contend whether groups may form or hold beliefs, she rather takes groups as 
pragmatic agents rather than epistemic agents (2006).
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with its own collective attitudes,4 whilst the application of a rule of rationality, spe-
cifically the conjunction rule (left-to-right), yields each epistemic agent’s composed 
attitude E1&E2, or p, that aims at knowledge. Then, how is the group attitude that 
comprises p formed? According to Tollefsen (2004, p. 58), overcoming the dilemma 
is a matter of how we are driven towards it. In the case that we opt for a conclu-
sion-driven approach, we would be following the first strategy in order to obtain the 
collective attitude, so the group would deem E1&E2 to be a false conjunction, and 
therefore not-p. However, it seems quite odd, in so far as the group, as an agent, 
would be then cognitively acting against the rule of rationality that is involved in the 
second strategy—which is followed by the individual agents though. After all, the 
application of the conjunction rule conducts each member towards her respective 
conclusions regarding p. Hence, Tollefsen opts for a premise-driven approach—that 
is, following the conjunction rule to bring about the group attitude p—to preserve 
the rationality of the group agent, hence suppressing the divergence between these 
two-level attitudes. So considered, we should not be tempted to see three epistemic 
agents and a group, but four epistemic agents, three of which co-operate in the ini-
tiation of the group functioning as a whole entity.
In turn, Kallestrup (2020, p. 5239) provides a slightly different prospect for 
approaching divergence. Let us take a jury of seven in a criminal court that is judg-
ing a defendant. During the trial, all the jurors are presented with evidence from 
the police report and a piece of testimony, both suggesting the defendant’s liability. 
However, the judge prompts the jury to ignore this information when rendering the 
verdict, since the evidence is not beyond a reasonable doubt and because, in her 
opinion, the testimony is not sufficiently reliable. Accordingly, the jury, as a whole, 
finds the defendant innocent, even though each juror, as an individual, thinks of the 
defendant as guilty after consideration of both the evidence and the testimony.5
The epistemic divergence shown by both the discursive dilemma and Kallestrup’s 
case leads us to think of the group as an entity of its own whose epistemic activ-
ity meets similar, if not straightforwardly equal, requirements as those of individual 
agents: collective acts just like individual acts in situations in which the performance 
towards knowledge is governed by the same standards that frame the attributions of 
epistemic states (Tollefsen, 2015, Ch. 5). So what is the problem? To answer this 
question, we need to make a detour through Ernest Sosa’s reliabilist virtue episte-
mology in Sect.  3. In essence, Sosa holds that knowledge results from the mani-
festation of an agent’s competent epistemic action. In terms of group agency, this 
increases the gap between collective competences and collective knowledge. Just 
like Kallestrup highlights, despite group knowledge attributions are not reducible 
to each member’s knowledge, group competence seems to be nothing more than the 
4 The aggregation of attitudes works in this framework as a consensus rule, that is, a majority rule that 
functions just as summativists hold.
5 In his paper, Kallestrup confronts this case (criminal court) with a subtle variation of it (civil court) by 
which he emphasizes the divergence between individual and group attitudes. However, I find that draw-
ing solely on the first case makes it clear enough for the purposes of this paper.
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aggregation of individual competences, giving rise to what he labels as the crucial 
disanalogy.
In this section I have claimed that an agential approach to the problem of group 
knowledge could be helpful in order to avoid the difficulties of accounting for group 
belief. I have presented the agential approach with the help of List and Pettit’s dis-
cursive dilemma, and then I have introduced the disanalogy that Kallestrup appreci-
ates between the group knowledge and group competence. My goal in the next sec-
tion is to elucidate this alleged disanalogy and to elaborate Kallestrup’s motivation 
for it.
3  The crucial disanalogy
First of all, as previously mentioned, the disanalogy makes sense in so far as we 
adopt Ernest Sosa’s (2010a, 2010b, 2015) reliabilist or competence6 virtue episte-
mology approach. According to this approach, a true belief amounts to knowledge 
when it is true because it is apt. Moreover, what determines the aptness of a belief? 
Its accuracy, that is, the way the cognitive performance of a given agent aims at a 
goal—a true belief that amounts to knowledge, in the case of epistemic actions—
being accurate in so far as it is adroit. Thus, knowledge, as apt belief, is seen as 
a cognitive achievement that results from the agent’s adroitness to perform cogni-
tively well, bringing about apt beliefs. Additionally, this triple-A (aptness, accuracy, 
adroitness) analysis of knowledge comes along with a triple-S analysis of the com-
petences that constitute the adroitness of the epistemic agent when aiming at suc-
cess—that is, avoiding cases of luck or mere chance. According to this analysis, for 
an agent to manifest a complete competence, this competence must meet three com-
ponents. First, there is the innermost competence, or the seat, that hosts the skill or 
disposition of the agent required for her to perform a given activity. Someone with 
the ability to drive a car would be said to have the innermost competence or skill of 
driving. Second, this innermost competence, or seat, must be present in combination 
with the inner competence, or the shape, that frames the agent’s performance. Our 
driver may be in an adverse state while driving, perhaps drunk or sleepy; therefore, 
despite having the innermost competence of driving, she fails in adopting the proper 
shape to engage in that action. Third, even a skilled agent in proper shape might 
Table 1  The discursive dilemma Evidence 1 Evidence 2 E1&E2 = p
Member 1 True True True
Member 2 True False False
Member 3 False True False
Group True True ¿?
6 Sosa considers both tags to be interchangeable in (2015, p. 36).
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perform a given action in adverse circumstances, like driving in hard rain or over an 
oiled road. The situation is, therefore, a necessary component that must also be met 
to manifest the complete competence to do something.
3.1  Summativist competences vs Non‑summativist knowledge
With Sosa’s triple-A and triple-S analyses in mind, Kallestrup concludes that even 
if a group agent may yield knowledge under the “apt belief” schema and knowledge 
is not the result of the summation of the group members’ knowledge but genuinely 
collective knowledge, group competence is not equally irreducible. Contrary to that, 
group competence results from the combined competences of its members. Kalle-
strup presents the disanalogy in the following terms:
On the one hand, a group’s innermost competence is reducible to a summa-
tion of innermost competences of its individual members and their manner of 
arrangement within the group. Of course, a group may have innermost com-
petences that none of its individual members have in isolation, but that’s com-
patible with the former being reducible to the totality of individual innermost 
competences, given how they are brought to bear within the group. Novel 
competences of groups do not spring into existence or mysteriously emerge 
when conjoining existing individual ones. On the other hand, the aptness of 
group belief is not similarly reducible to the aptness of the beliefs of its indi-
vidual members. [I]t’s possible for the aptness of group belief to diverge from 
the aptness of a majority of, or indeed every single, individual belief, and so 
there is no question of the former being captured by a summation of the lat-
ter. Reasons for the disanalogy include that a group’s innermost competence 
can produce the truth of its belief even though no individual beliefs are even 
formed, and that the shape and situation that are suitable for a group’s inner-
most competence to produce the truth of its belief differ from the shape and 
situation that are suitable for the individual innermost competences to produce 
the truths of individual beliefs. Thus, there are various ways in which a group 
can be such that the truth of its belief manifests competence, its innermost 
competence is nothing over and above the joint innermost competences of its 
individual members, yet the truth of its belief manifesting competence does 
not consist in the truths of its members’ beliefs manifesting their competences. 
(2020, p. 5242)
How does this picture fit in cases of group epistemic agency such as the discursive 
dilemma? Let us take the example of the discursive dilemma. Kallestrup’s diagnosis 
does not go against the claim that the group epistemic outcome (p = true) is irreduc-
ible to its members’ epistemic outcomes. Contrary to that, he stresses the disanalogy 
because, on the one hand, group knowledge may be irreducible to individual knowl-
edge and, on the other hand, it is the individual members’ competence which is to be 
manifested in order to achieve that group knowledge. In his view, the group has no 
“innermost competences over and above the joint innermost competences of its indi-
vidual members”. Thus, the problem lies in how to proceed in behalf of an account 
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of group competence when the collective apt belief that amounts to knowledge does 
not seem to be due to any other competence than those that are individually seated 
in each member. Kallestrup is willing to accept that a group may have a compe-
tence that none of its members has, although his acceptance relies upon the idea that 
this group competence is, as mentioned, ‘nothing over and above the summation or 
combination of the individual members’. Moreover, and this is very important, he 
does not constrain the group competence to the summation of individual compe-
tences, but considers its arrangement within the group, which is related to its inter-
nal organisation.
3.2  The first defence of group epistemic competence
In order to avoid the disanalogy, I envisage group organisation consisting of 
three steps that can be identified in the discursive dilemma as depited in Table  1 
(Sect. 2.2). First, each individual member evaluates both pieces of evidence E1 and 
E2, from which each member comes to form their own individual attitudes towards 
each piece of evidence independently. Second, since it has no other resources, the 
group relies on its members’ attitudes about E1 and about E2 to form its own atti-
tudes about them. In the third and critical step, every epistemic agent framed in this 
picture obtains their own attitude p—that is, an attitude that results from the con-
junction of the epistemic outcomes previously formed regarding E1 and E2.7
This analysis shows two levels of attitudes, that is, individual attitudes and group 
attitudes. Both levels initially seem to differ as to the ownership of the competence 
that leads to the acquisition of the resulting attitude. Intuitively, according to the first 
step, we might be quick to accept that all the members are relatively autonomous 
in forming their attitudes, whilst the group is not. Likewise, the second step under-
lines the essential group dependence on its members to form its attitudes. However, 
regarding competence, it is not clear how far individual and group competence dif-
fer in terms of autonomy. In order to form its own collective attitudes, the group 
depends on its members’ attitudes. The group comes to regard E1 as true because 
two on one of its members deem E1 as true. The same applies with respect to E2. 
Just like individuals deliberate on the reasons to believe E1 and E2, groups can also 
be seen as deliberators in their own particular way—that is, the group deliberates 
considering its members’ attitudes as reasons to endorse E1 and E2. Furthermore, 
both types of deliberating agents can be seen as similarly dependent in terms of 
epistemic materials.8 If so, the difference between both types of agents is the nature 
8 The notion of epistemic material has to do, according to Dragos (2021, p. 2), with the resources on 
which an epistemic agent relies on (“e.g. evidence held, deliberations undertaken, inferences drawn, 
cognitive abilities exercised”) in order to generate knowledge. Thus, on his view it is the possession of 
the epistemic materials that generate knowledge what delineates the difference between epistemic exten-
sion—"the idea that a subject can possess knowledge when other subjects possess some of the epistemic 
materials”—and epistemic autonomy—"the possession of knowledge entails possession of all the epis-
7 What is remarkably distinctive of the third step is that, contrary to steps one and two, in which each 
agent—individual members in the first step, the group agent as a whole in the second step—forms an 
attitude about E1 and another attitude about E2, this final step depicts a situation in which the epistemic 
outcome results from the conjuction of the previously formed attitudes E1 and E2.
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of the epistemic materials that are required to produce the attitude at each level 
of deliberation. Thus, individuals may draw on a variety of epistemic materials—
regardless of any consideration of internalist or externalist approaches about the 
nature of such materials—whilst the group relies, minimally, on its members’ atti-
tudes as epistemic materials in combination with a normative guidance,9 the major-
ity rule, to form what may be dubbed as basic attitudes. This second step conse-
quently shows that group competence bluntly depends on its members’ competences 
to produce basic group attitudes. However, a different picture emerges in the third 
step. By this point in the story, as mentioned, each epistemic agent is provided with 
its own attitudes towards E1 and E2, which are necessary in order to produce the 
epistemic outcome p that results from the conjunction of both attitudes. Thus far, the 
group epistemic agent had to rely on its members’ attitudes in order to form its own 
attitudes, but not after this moment. Just like each individual epistemic agent, the 
group can reach p, and do so on its own.
So, keeping in mind that it is p, and neither E1 nor E2, the kind of group epis-
temic outcome that poses a problem like the crucial disanalogy, and because in the 
discursive dilemma, the group brings about p and does not rely straightforwardly on 
individual competences, but on an organisational component that affects the group 
just like it does in the case of its individual members—however, not depending on 
them—the crucial disanalogy vanishes. The group epistemic agent manifests its own 
competence—that is, following the rational rule of conjunction—in order to know p.
3.3  Objection to the first response to the crucial disanalogy
One might make an objection, and a very important one, indeed. Kallestrup’s 
approach is framed within Sosa’s conception of competences, according to which 
a complete competence is determined by three components: the seat or skill, the 
shape, and the situation. Which component prompts the group agent to follow the 
rule of conjunction instead of the rule of majority in order to arrive at p? It seems 
unclear whether it is part of the situation as situation involves contextual or circum-
stantial constraints, which is not the case. We could presume that it is the seat, but 
then we would have to deal with a problem that mirrors an essential component 
of the crucial disanalogy. Kallestrup does not deny group competence. Instead, he 
holds that its innermost competence, or seat, amounts to the summation of the mem-
bers’ innermost competences. That is why he identifies an organisational element, 
since «the way the group is situated or shaped dictates that it must oppose a majority 
attitude in order to avoid violating rationality requirements» (2020, p. 5244), as part 
9 It is important to exclude normative guidance as part of the epistemic materials on which the group 
relies. As Dragos points out, «normative properties are not epistemic materials […] [E]pistemic materi-
als can stand in reliability relations, but reliability properties are not epistemic materials […] [E]pistemic 
materials do not include reasons themselves but our response to or engagement with reasons, that is, 
what we take to be reasons» (2021, p. 3).





of the group competence’s shape. Accordingly, any attempt to defend an account 
of group competence that appeals to rationality constraints as the seat of the com-
petence for a collective epistemic agent will be, in his opinion, doomed to failure. 
However, his stance might inherit part of the individualistic tendency that he is try-
ing to cope with due to the seemingly unavoidable individualistic traits of the notion 
of innermost competence, or seat, itself: «the innermost […] competence […] in 
one’s brain, nervous system, and body, which [one] retains even while asleep or 
drunk» (Sosa, 2015, p. 95; 2017, p. 191). Thus, in the game of manifesting compe-
tences as a group epistemic agent, if there is no brain, there is no gain. Any attempt 
to contest group competence would require capitulation.
This section has submitted Kallestrup’s crucial disanalogy as the situation in 
which group knowledge—that is, an epistemic outcome that is not necessarily reduc-
ible to individual knowledge—is not yielded by strictly group competence, but by 
the summation or aggregation of individual competences. Then I have put forward 
an account for group competence in three steps and two levels of epistemic agency. 
This proposal is threatened by a significant objection in Kallestrup’s view: what I 
allegedly take as the group’s innermost competence would be actually its shape, in 
so far as it has to do with the organizational requirement. Additionally, this quibble 
is consistent with Sosa’s consideration of the innermost competence as biologically 
hosted in the agent, something that intuitively a group agent is not able to satisfiy in 
terms others than mere summation. In the next section I will deepen into the notion 
of competence and the way group agents can manifest it in such a way that it does 
not reduce to individual competences.
4  Competence and (group) know‑how
According to Sosa, competences «are dispositions of an agent to perform well» 
(2010a, p. 465), so they are «special cases of dispositions» (2010a, p. 466) to «suc-
ceed with a certain aim, and a competence to believe correctly is a special case of 
that» (2015, p. 43). Are competences and abilities, therefore, interchangeable? It is 
unclear. A driver may manifest her driving competence in so far as she is able to 
drive a car. However, she could easily be competent to drive a car despite being 
unable to do so. For example, a driver may have the skill to drive—and an official 
license that certifies it—but is incapable of doing so because she is blind drunk or 
the road conditions are deplorable. The distinction has to do with whether the shape 
and the situation components of competence are met. Thus, according to Sosa, com-
petence and ability are not entirely interchangeable in so far as only the former is 
manifested as the combination of seat—that is, innermost competence—shape and 
situation (2010a, p. 465): one is able to drive if she has the skill of driving, but hav-
ing the skill is not enough for her to exercise her ability. Similarly, «all competences 
are dispositions to succeed, but not all dispositions to succeed are competences» 
(2015, p. 100). In this case, the difference refers to the way the agent achieves suc-
cess across a range of possibilities. Dispositions set mere possibilities to succeed 
when performing the action φ, whereas competences tie dispositions down in a reli-
able way to succeed when performing the action φ. This is because the agent has the 
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skill to succeed when performing the action φ and exerts it in the proper shape and 
in a good situation, which brings us to the core issue of what skill is in Sosa’s terms:
The complete competence to drive a car on a given occasion includes factors 
such as the condition of the light (headlights working), one’s hands being free, 
and so on, for various situational factors. It will include also various internal 
occasional factors, such as one’s alcohol level, one’s relevant shape at the time. 
Included also, finally, is a stable innermost competence, the know-how that 
remains even when one is poorly situated and in bad shape. Not all such inner 
competences are faculties but all faculties are inner competences.10 (2019, pp. 
21–22)
4.1  Skill, competence, know‑how
In the previous section, we stumbled upon a problem when attempting to defend 
group competence regarding some sort of psychophysical requirement for an agent 
to host a skill—or seat, as one of the triple-S analysis’ components. Sosa’s terminol-
ogy stresses this conception of skill as internal to the agent, provided that it is the 
innermost competence that is primarily required for an agent to manifest a compe-
tent performance. However, Sosa does not provide further details about what the 
skill consists of. If we need to delve into it, we have to resort to other approaches. 
One such approach, rather close to Sosa’s, is that of David Löwenstein (2017). In his 
Rylean analysis of know-how, he puts forward that competence, skill, and know-how 
are notions linked by more than a family resemblance. From the beginning, follow-
ing Ryle’s assumption that know-how is not merely an ability, but a special kind of 
ability—being equivalent to skill or competence (2017, p. 6)—, he admits that the 
usage of « ‘know-how’, ‘competence’, and ‘skill’ [are] largely interchangeabl[e]» 
(2017, p. 7), that is, «know-how, competence and skill are one» (2017, p. 23). The 
difference between these terms would then respond to a terminological variety issue, 
not to the presence of distinctively conceptual traits among them: each would be 
referring to the same phenomenon, say, intelligent practice (ibid.). Even Löwenstein 
himself admits the extant vicinity between his account and Sosa’s, despite not delv-
ing into it (2017, p. 30). In any case, the relevance of this paper involves how his 
account presents skill, competence, and know-how to be equivalent.
Firstly, Löwenstein holds the claim that «knowing how to engage in an activity 
is knowing how to live up to the norms of that activity» (2017, p. 23). For an agent 
to play football, she is required to know how to play football appropriately. How-
ever, knowing the set of norms that governs the play—norms such as ‘do not touch 
the ball with your hands, unless you are the goalkeeper or the game is stopped’, 
for instance—does not suffice to know how to play football. Löwenstein refers to 
the kind of norms that govern the performance by which a football player is identi-
fied as such. Plenty of people may exhibit some abilities involved in the practice of 




is not enough. Those abilities are to be seen as general in contrast with the specific 
abilities that a competent football player should show in order to be accounted for 
as such. Moreover, those specific abilities have to do with the degree of reliability 
that credits how skilled the agent is in the attainment of her goal (2017, p. 28). Fur-
thermore, fulfilling the norms in such a way that credits the agent’s reliability when 
exhibiting the ability that is governed by those norms does not suffice to count as a 
competent agent either: «it requires further that one’s performances are guided by 
the norms of the activity in question» (2017, p. 30). That is, the agent’s performance 
must be carried out following normative guidance that constitutes her action in such 
a way that corresponds with her intention to achieve success (2017, p. 31). The 
importance of normative guidance as a constitutive element for know-how—as well 
as competence and skill, consequently—relies on the fact that the agent’s perfor-
mance must not merely conform to a set of norms11 that barely grasps how to engage 
in the activity that the performance aims to engage in (2017, p. 36). Instead, norma-
tive guidance should be integrated into the agent’s performance by an understanding 
of the norms that govern it (2017, p. 45). Does it mean that our football player has 
to understand the movements and techniques involved in her practice when training 
or during a match? Not necessarily. That kind of, say, modular understanding should 
result from a later moment, when the agent may theorise her practice by abstract-
ing it from the practical performance. Understanding the norms that guide a compe-
tent or skilled performance has to do with the connection that the agent establishes 
between a set of practices and the attained goals for which that set of practices serve 
as a good candidate as a means to succeed. Therefore, the best way to achieve that 
understanding is to engage in the practices that must be understood by following the 
rules that govern them, to develop the agent’s knowledge or competence to perform 
successfully. In the end, to know how to play football, it is much more appropriate 
for playing football rather than watching the match from the comfort of one’s sofa.
I take it that the sense of integration that we infer from Löwenstein’s proposal 
on the understanding of the norms that guide know-how in skilled agents is quite 
similar to Sosa’s conception of the innermost seat. The main difference between the 
two lies in that the former does not necessarily assume any implications related to 
individualism.12 However, there are a couple of salient features that both approaches 
share. First of all, although in different ways, they are conceptualising the same phe-
nomenon. Let us think of the driver from the triple-S analysis for competences. We 
could take her to be a skilled driver in the same way that we could say that she is an 
agent who has driving know-how, and the analysis remains the same. It is not just 
that she has the ability to drive a car, but she is capable of driving a car because of 
11 Cfr. Löwenstein (2017, Ch. 1, §1.6) for clarification on the vicinity between his approach based on 
normative guidance and the Wittgensteinian rule-following account for language. In a nutshell, both con-
ceptions are tantamount regarding the way action and expressions are shaped either by norms or rules 
that make sense in so far as they constitute the conditions of evaluation or its correctness. The corner-
stone has to do with the crucial notion of practice.
12 Although Sosa admits due relevance to the social roots of knowledge (2015, Ch. 8), his organicist 
conception of the seat consigns it into an individual’s brain and nerve system, forcing any appreciation of 
group competence to be done in terms of methodological individualism.
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her understanding of the norms that govern the practice of driving a car; an under-
standing that is properly integrated into her character as an agent, which leads us to 
the second point: both Sosa and Löwenstein’s approaches assume that the way com-
petence guides an agent’s performance aiming at success involves, in turn, a way to 
account for a responsible action. In this case, “responsible” is tantamount to “cred-
itable”. The core element of know-how, competence and skill is normative guid-
ance, but the way it guides the performance of the agent by means of the norms that 
govern the activity is understood as the responsible control that the agent has over 
those norms in virtue of her understanding of them (2017, p. 123). What is more: 
«competent actors are answerable to the norms of the activity they are engaging in, 
and they take responsibility for meeting them. In a word, the mark of know-how is 
responsible control13» (2017, p. 124). In short, both accounts are intermingled by 
the idea that understanding14 the normative guidance required for a given successful 
performance establishes the ownership of the competence.15
4.2  A twofold account of group know‑how
Regarding the picture of competence as know-how, two questions follow when con-
templating it in the case of group agents. How is the character of a group agent 
to be conceived, and how is the normative guidance that constitutes its know-how 
integrated into it? In what follows, I will draw on Palermos and Tollefsen’s (2018) 
account of group know-how to address the answer in terms of non-reducibility 
to individual know-how.16 Their approach is divided into three parts. First, they 
envisage two ways in which group know-how can be devised, either as the addi-
tion or integration of the member’s individual knowledge-how to establish group 
14 The requirement of understanding the norms that regulate the practice for which an agent manifests 
competence should prompt us to further question the nature of understanding itself, something that is 
beyond the scope of this paper. Some philosophers have even argued that understanding itself is know-
how (Hills, 2016) whereas others have responded against this possibility (Sullivan, 2018). Regard-
ing what is relevant for the analysis of competence in general, and specifically the group competences 
approached here, I will restrict the idea of understanding to a broadly assumed common sense notion.
15 Is the notion of competence equivalent here to the one of expertise, as an anonymous reviewer for 
Synthese has suggested? Such reduction is objectionable, I believe, at least if we I assume Martini’s 
(2015, 2019) tenet that being an expert requires social recognition. Despite the strong normative burden 
of the account of competence as know-how I am putting forward, it does not require such social recog-
nition. I thank one of the referees for useful insight with respect to group expertise, a topic I intend to 
target in future research.
16 My argument against the reducibility of group competence to individual competence is independent 
of Palermos and Tollefsen’s account of group know-how. I could thus have not resourced to it, but I think 
that this little detour will be helpful to attain my goal, since Palermos and Tollefsen’s view provides prin-
cipled motivation for the idea that group agents are entities whose activity does not reduce to the actitiv-
ity of its members.
13 This characterisation of responsible control parallels Sosa’s metacompetences in cases of reflective 




knowledge-how. Second, they provide an intellectualist17 conception of group know-
how in accordance with the additive strategy. Third, they put forward an anti-intel-
lectualist alternative that conforms to the integrative plan. As a result, they conclude 
that paradigmatic cases of group know-how—such as musical collectives that play 
pieces together, industrial production lines or sports teams—manifest know-how 
that is not possessed by any of the individual members that participate in collective 
performances.
With respect to the first part, group know-how may be considered as the result 
of the aggregation of individual pieces of know-how—in the same way that sum-
mativists relate respect to belief—or the integration of a collection of individual 
know-how (2018, p. 115). The former is the case of an automotive production line. 
Each worker contributes to the final outcome—a vehicle ready to be brought to mar-
ket—in their respective fields of expertise. Accordingly, everyone knows how to do 
their part, but no one knows how to make a car (2018, p. 116). It leads to the con-
sideration of integration as the right way to understand group know-how, accord-
ing to which the mere summation of individual contributions does not accurately 
describe in an explanatory way how a group may engage in certain activities and 
be responsibly creditable for its outcomes (2018, p. 117). The key element required 
to understand how the integration of individual know-how produces an irreducible 
group know-how or skill lies in the set of «complex interactions of individual mem-
bers» (ibid.) which give rise to the collective properties that identify the group as the 
entity that deserves the attribution of the performance.
The second part of their argument envisages an intellectualist approach for group 
know-how in terms of joint intentionality,18 whereas the third part shows an anti-
intellectualist alternative that makes sense in combination with the distributed cog-
nition hypothesis.19 The primary difference among both concerns the principle of 
interdependence that fixes the group as the entity subject to the attribution of know-
how. Given that intellectualism claims that saying that an agent knows how to φ is 
the same as saying that an agent knows a way, W, to do φ, the intellectualist approach 
to group know-how addresses interdependence between members stating that they 
coordinate by accepting W as the way to collectively do φ, so they jointly intend to 
follow W (2018, p. 119). However, «many times, groups of people manifest [group 
17 Intellectualism about know-how is the view that knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that (Stan-
ley, 2011; Stanley and Williamson, 2001), responding to what is considered to be Ryle’s anti-intellec-
tualism (1945, 1949), which holds that knowledge-how cannot be captured by propositions. There are 
also positions that combine both approaches (Bengson and Moffet, 2011). In this paper, I remain neutral 
regarding the debates on the nature of know-how, although it may be rightfully inferred that I am much 
more sympathetic to anti-intellectualism of group know-how in terms similar to Dragos’ (2019).
18 Joint intentionality is a phenomenon where several individuals coordinate their actions guided by 
a common goal; in such a way that everyone’s intention assumes that the rest has the same intention 
(Toumela, 2000b, 2006).
19 If the hypothesis of extended mind (Clark and Chalmers, 1998) holds that there are cases in which 
mental states and cognitive processes extend beyond the boundaries of the skin and skull to set couple 
systems with objects and artifacts, the hypothesis of distributed cognition assumes that those states and 
processes may extend across individuals rendering collective mentality and cognition (Palermos, 2016; 
Theiner, 2013; Tollefsen, 2004, 2006).
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know-how] even though they have not previously jointly accepted a specific way, 
W, which is the way that they perform their collective skill» and because «in fact, 
empirical evidence indicates that coordination creates commitment» (2018, p. 120). 
This prompts us to the alternative combination of anti-intellectualism and distrib-
uted cognition, where the principle of interdependence is set in terms of «continu-
ous reciprocal interactions» between the members of a group (2018, p. 121). This 
view, based on the Dynamical Systems Theory (DTS),20 explains group know-how 
in terms of emergent properties, according to which:
when individual members coordinate on the basis of reciprocal interactions, 
they adapt mutually to each other by restricting their actions in such a way so 
as to reliably—that is, regularly—achieve ends that they would only luckily—
if ever—bring about were they to act on their own. (2018, p. 122)
Palermos and Tollefsen’s twofold account of group know-how helps understand the 
way the character of a group agent is shaped and how the normative guidance that 
governs a given performance integrates into it. Both additive and integrative concep-
tions for group know-how respectively parallel a way of conceiving how the princi-
ple of interdependence is established between the members that construct the group 
character. On the one hand, joint acceptance of W as the way to do φ as a group 
involves, in turn, that each member commits to a norm—say, individual commit-
ment to accept W, as the way to jointly do φ as a group, is necessary to do φ as a 
group. In addition, each member must also know that the other members accept W, 
as the way to do φ as a group jointly, and so on—which established the group as 
such: it is a norm—of a set of norms, depending on the case—endorsed by indi-
vidual members under particular conditions that distinguishes the group in an addi-
tive way. On the other hand, mutual interdependence in the coordination of ongoing 
and reciprocal performances between the members of the group towards a com-
mon goal gives rise to irreducible group properties which determine the members’ 
behaviour to preserve the group’s activity as a whole. It might be the case that indi-
vidual norms established in coordination initiate the group activity—in terms of a 
bottom-up process—however, as soon as this activity is underway, those norms take 
a back seat in favour of normative guidance that designates the group as the subject 
that must follow it in order to engage in a successful performance. Thus, the group 
switches from a set of individual agents to a dynamical system agent in accordance 
with the way each level of agency is governed by a given set of normative guid-
ance—in terms of an up-down process.
In this section, I have shown that the innermost competence or skill, according to 
Sosa’s triple-S analysis, that is primarily necessary for an agent to achieve success in 
φing through competence manifestation when engaging in the performance of φing 
is, in Löwenstein’s terms, the agent’s knowledge how to φ. This view envisages an 
agent’s knowledge-how to φ guided by the norms that govern the performance of 
φing achieving success, and in such a way that her action is not merely the result 
20 Cfr. Palermos (2016) for a detailed presentation of the implications of DTS in the emergence of 
strictly collective properties that define group cognition.
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of adjusting her behaviour to the norms that regulate the practice she is engaging 
in, but also that she manifests her understanding of those norms and how they reli-
ably lead to success. I have also introduced Palermos and Tollefsen’s account of 
group know-how, according to which group action based on knowledge-how can be 
approached either as an additive phenomenon that relies on joint intentionality or an 
integrative one that is built as the result of ongoing mutual interactions between the 
members from which strictly collective properties emerge. Each approach implies a 
different way to take normativity as the guide to successful performance, given that 
the additive conception for group know-how operates with a bottom-up direction 
of fit—that is, individuals configuring the norms that regulate the group behaviour 
towards success—whilst the integrative concept does so with a top-down direction 
of fit—where individuals adjust their behaviour to lead the dynamics of group per-
formance towards success.
Thus, the rather internalistic assumption of innermost competence need not be lit-
erally endorsed. Group know-how or competence might be located in «one’s brain, 
nervous system, and body». However, the “one” addressed here is distributed among 
the members, from an integrative conception of group know-how, whose behaviour 
is determined in so far as the normative guidance that governs the activity of the 
group requires the members to coordinate to achieve success. Therefore, it is true 
that, in the game of manifesting competences as a group epistemic agent, if there is 
no brain, there is no gain. The key point is that a one-to-one relation between brain 
and competence is not necessarily required, so the normative guidance that deter-
mines an agent to be truly competent to perform a given action may be distributed 
across a range of individuals that act «as a body» (Gilbert, 2004, p. 100).
5  (Group) competence as (group) normative status
At the end of Sect. 3, I stressed the fact that Kallestrup’s denial of group competence 
focuses specifically on pointing out that the group’s innermost competence results 
from the summation of each individual’s innermost competences. I have provided 
an alternative, according to which group innermost competence—or skill, or know-
how—is then the normative guidance it takes to perform towards success. However, 
he would disagree with this claim. The set of norms that regulate the group’s activ-
ity, he holds, constitute an organisational element that is to be deemed as part of 
the shape or situation of the group, but not of its seat (2020, p. 5246). He draws 
on Schmitt’s notion of chartered group (1994), where the “charter” comprises the 
«rules, norms, standards» that regulate the group activity in order to fulfil its goal 
(2020, p. 5242), in a way that any norms that govern the group behaviour should be 
part of its charter—which is shaped by the members. Consequently, as aforecited, 
«the way the group is situated or shaped dictates that it must oppose a majority atti-
tude in order to avoid violating rationality requirements» (2020, p. 5244). Remem-
bering the discursive dilemma, the decision to refuse to follow the majority rule 
when attaining p as the conjunction of both E1 and E2 is supposed to be part of 
the group’s charter, and not a manifestation of strictly group competence. Hence, 
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group innermost competence is, according to Kallestrup, nothing over and above the 
aggregation of the members’ innermost competences.
However, nothing prevents the group from assuming the application of majority 
rule to produce the group attitude p. Since the charter is built according to the rules, 
norms and standards set by the individual members, they could easily agree to main-
tain the majority rule in their deliberation towards p. The crucial disanalogy unfolds 
as soon as we consider the group as a genuine group epistemic agent that should 
rationally conclude p from both true pieces of evidence E1 and E2. Kallestrup might 
even reply that switching from the majority rule to the conjunction rule as soon as 
the group is equipped with its own basic beliefs could be already foreseen within the 
group charter. Nevertheless, this objection does not change the fact that, regardless 
of its prior consideration by the group members, following the conjunction rule in 
this context determines the agent’s rationality that aims at producing an epistemic 
outcome based on p.
In any case, I agree with Kallestrup in that the group’s charter intends to consti-
tute the group’s capacity to perform the kind of epistemic actions that depicts the 
discursive dilemma. However, I disagree about the charter’s scope in the constitu-
tion of the group’s innermost competence. As Palermos and Tollefsen’s twofold 
approach to group know-how shows, Kallestrup’s conception of norms as determi-
nants of the group’s shape makes sense in terms of intellectualist group know-how—
in the sense that the group is guided by explicit norms that result from the member’s 
joint acceptance. The same does not apply in the case of anti-intellectualist group 
know-how in which implicit norms guide a collective agent’s performance that the 
members assume over the course of ongoing group performances that prompt the 
individuals to adjust their behaviour in accordance with the group’s activity towards 
success. According to my account, both approaches should be considered as a reflec-
tion of the two levels of attitudes in which, on the one hand, basic group attitudes 
result from the majority of individual attitudes and, on the other hand, the group’s 
attitude towards p results from the conjunction of both attitudes towards E1 and E2, 
just as any other rational epistemic agent should do.
Therefore, we should consider group epistemic competence as the group norma-
tive status that guides towards knowledge. The notion of normative status is inspired 
by List and Pettit’s approach to group responsibility (2011, part III). According to 
their view, a group agent is accountable for its actions in so far as it «faces a nor-
matively significant choice, involving the possibility of doing something good or 
bad, right or wrong», «[it] has the understanding and access to evidence required 
for making normative judgments about the options», as well as «the control required 
for choosing between the options» (2011, p. 158). The normative status is not con-
fined to account for the responsibility of a competent agent, since being competent 
is more than being merely responsible—in terms of merits or faults—of certain out-
come. Being competent is also being up to certain expectations that other agents 
have about what one does, or those that the agent herself may have. Being competent 
also means acknowledging that assessments of one’s performance make sense in a 
network of rights and duties, and being able to recognise specific values or disvalues 
in the practice… In this way, the normative status comprises both the normative 
guidance that governs the group’s performance towards achieving success—that is, 
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it aims to result in an epistemic outcome—and the character into which the norma-
tive guidance integrates. Both the normative guidance and the character are dynami-
cally fixed by the practices in which the agent engages, so as to the former shapes 
the latter and the latter enhances the former..21
This conception of competence makes room for and even leads to the considera-
tion of such competent group epistemic agents as subjects that may produce reflec-
tive knowledge; to the extent that this kind of epistemic outcome results from the 
exercising of second-order competences. However, I admit this idea is like splitting 
hairs unless we accept that every piece of knowledge produced by group agents, 
despite it not being necessarily reducible to its member’s knowledge, reverts back to 
the individual members. Thus, we might contemplate group competence scaffolding 
individual competences, and this would match the sense by which sociality repre-
sents a salient component for human beings.22
6  Conclusion
In this paper, I have defended an account of genuine group epistemic competence 
that identifies it with the group normative status that guides its performance when 
attempting to produce knowledge successfully. First, I suggested that the discus-
sion may move forward by focusing on epistemic agency instead of getting stuck on 
the contentious issue of group belief. Then, I showed how group epistemic agency 
leads to discords between individual and collective attitudes as depicted in the dis-
cursive dilemma. Moreover, Kallestrup’s crucial disanalogy, as presented, assumes 
that there is some sort of mismatch between group knowledge and group compe-
tence since group knowledge is irreducible to its members’ knowledge, whereas the 
group competence that produces this knowledge results from the summation of the 
members’ competences. After that, I focused on an analysis of competence compar-
ing Sosa’s triple-S analysis and Löwenstein conception of know-how as competence, 
concluding that both agree that competence is manifested when an agent performs 
an action guided by a norm or set of norms whose understanding reliably leads her 
to success. Having grasped this normative sense of competence, I considered it in 
light of Palermos and Tollefsen’s dual focus on group knowledge-how. According 
to their approach, group know-how may be taken either from an intellectualist-joint 
acceptance perspective or an anti-intellectualist-dynamical view. Finally, I put for-
wards my response to Kallestrup, highlighting that, even though part of the process 
by which group competence emerges is reducible to individual competences—on 
the additive level that is governed by majority rule—genuine group competence is 
21 I am aware that the concept of normative status deserves further development. However, the main 
focus of this paper is the problem stressed by Kallestrup that there seems to be some form of disanalogy 
between group competence and individual competences. Dealing with that disanalogy is my main goal 
here, and an exhaustive account on what the normative status of an agent consists in will be the object of 
a forthcoming inquiry.
22 My statement coincides with Craig’s (1990) conception of the social roots of the concept of knowl-
edge, especially as detailed in Ch. 8.
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not equally reducible to its members’ competence because it is the result of the inte-
gration that takes place on a different level governed by the conjunction rule that 
guides any rational epistemic agent towards success—in our case, an epistemic out-
come. Therefore, group epistemic competence amounts to group normative guid-
ance when aiming at knowledge.
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